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I. Introduction 
"Real property" as a topic exists only in a law professor's 
mind. Practicing attorneys may specialize in representing 
title companies or developers or brokers or any of the other 
entrepreneurs who make their living in one way or another 
from real estate, but none of these lawyers would claim that 
his proper field of expertise is real estate per se. Consequent-
ly, any article on developments in the field of real property 
law really becomes a series of separate articles on develop-
ments in some real estate specialties, rather than a cohesive 
whole. I have tried, here, to cover the three specialties which 
have undergone the greatest growth during 1969, and that 
may be of some interest to those who do not devote their entire 
time to these matters. 
II. Third·Party Tort Liability 
Suppose that while John Doe is visiting some friends in their 
home he is scalded when he turns on the hot water tap. He 
can show that the hot water system is defective, but can dem-
onstrate no actual negligence in construction. Furthermore, 
the contractor who built the home has since gone out of busi-
ness. Has he any chance of prevailing in an action against 
a savings and loan institution that made the original con-
struction loan on the house? In 1968, no real estate lawyer 
would have taken the case (although a personal injury at-
torney would have seriously thought about it); in 1969, it 
would have looked like a beautiful case to any attorney; and, 
in 1970, the case has become doubtful again. 
The reason that the case would have looked unpromising 
in 1968 was that it fell short of traditional real estate notions 
of liability in four respects: (1) Doe was not the owner or 
possessor of the premises, (2) he could not prove negligence, 
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(3) he was seeking personal injury relief rather than property 
damage, (4) he was not suing a party who "caused" the con-
dition. 
By 1969, each of these limitations standing in the way of 
recovery was discarded or at least weakened. Ultimately a 
new roadblock to recovery was thrown up by the legislature, 
but the judicial development that preceded it should first be 
described. 
A. Parties Plaintiff 
Until 1958, no one other than the direct purchaser of a 
house could recover from a contractor for negligent construc-
tion after the purchaser had accepted the completed house 
unless the premises were inherently dangerous. l Then in Dow 
v. Holly Mfg. CO.,2 the State Supreme Court rejected this 
"completed and accepted" defense, and held that a remote 
purchaser could recover without privity. Three years later, 
in Stewart v. COX,3 the State Supreme Court informed the 
legal profession that under the tests of Biakanja v. Irving,4 
privity was not required in actions concerning the real estate 
construction field. 
But in both of the cases just mentioned, the plaintiffs were 
either tenants or owners of the property. Whether a non-
possessing, nonowning visitor could recover was not settled.5 
In 1969, the State Supreme Court decided Elmore v. Ameri-
can Motors Corp.6 where a defect in a Rambler station wagon 
caused it to fishtail and cross over in front of an oncoming 
vehicle, killing the driver of the oncoming car. Strict liability 
had been applied long enough in the chattel field to make it 
1. See Hale v. Depaoli, 33 Cal.2d 
228, 201 P.2d 1, 13 A.L.R.2d 183 
(1948). 
2. 49 Ca1.2d 720, 321 P.2d 736 
(1958). 
3. 55 Cal.2d 857, 13 Cal. Rptr. 521, 
362 P.2d 345 (1961). 
4. 49 Cal.2d 647, 320 P.2d \6, 65 
A.L.R.2d 1358 (1958). 
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5. Except in the case where the con-
tractor was still working on the prem-
ises. See Chance v. Lawry's Inc., 58 
Cal. 2d 368, 24 Cal. Rptr. 209, 374 
P .2d 185 (1962). 
6. 70 Cal.2d 578, 75 Cal. Rptr. 652, 
451 P.2d 84 (1969). For further dis-
cussion of this case, see Moreau, TORTS, 
in this volume. 
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certain that the owner of the Rambler could recover from the 
manufacturer or retailer, but the question of whether "by-
standers" could also recover was novel. The Court held that 
they could: 
If anything, bystanders should be entitled to greater pro-
tection than the consumer or user where injury to by-
standers from the defect is reasonably foreseeable. Con-
sumers and users, at least, have the opportunity to in-
spect for defects and to limit their purchases to articles 
manufactured by reputable manufacturers and sold by 
reputable retailers, whereas the bystander ordinarily 
has no such opportunities. In short, the bystander is 
in greater need of protection from defective products 
which are dangerous, and if any distinction should be 
made between bystanders and users, it should be made, 
contrary to the position of defendants, to extend greater 
liability in favor of the bystanders.7 
. Is the analogy between the pedestrian or oncoming motor-
ist and the visitor on the premises sufficiently close to permit 
Elmore to work in the real estate field? The practical ability 
of the casual visitor to check out the plumbing of his host's 
house before washing his hands seems less real than for a 
pedestrian to watch oncoming cars. And earlier, in Dow v. 
Holly Mfg. Co. s the State Supreme Court indicated that there 
is a substantial similarity between contractors and auto-
mobile' manufacturers: 
There is also a close analogy between a supplier of chat-
tels and a general contractor for the construction of a 
building. The contractor supplies all of the materials 
used as well as the labor either by fabricating it himself, 
buying it from another or having an independent sub-
constructor do the same thing. The owner in effect buys 
a properly completed building from the contractor which 
the contractor is bound to supply. In the case of the 
supplier of chattels when he supplies the goods it is im-
7. 70 Ca1.2d 578 at 586-587, 75 Cal. 8. 49 Ca1.2d 720, 321 P.2d 736 
Rptr. 652 at 657, 451 P.2d 84 at 89. (1958). 
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material to his liability that he may have had another 
supply the product; he is nevertheless liable because he 
has vouched for the chattels as his own by taking the con-
tract. The same is true of a house where he supplies 
many parts, as well as labor, most of which are probably 
not fabricated by him but by independent contractors 
or sellers. In such case the supplier is liable to third 
persons for negligence.9 
Until 1969, it could have been argued that the affording 
of protection to non possessors of chattels had no bearing on 
the protection to be given to nonpossessors of land, because 
of the historical rules making a nonpossessor's rights depend-
ent on whether he was an invitee, licensee, or trespasser. But 
with the Supreme Court's landmark decision in Rowland v. 
Christian, l{) abolishing these distinctions and making negli-
gence the test in all cases, the analogy between personal and 
real property becomes difficult to resist. Rowland, even more 
than Elmore, shows that persons injured on land need not 
own or possess the land in order to recover. Rowland, alone, 
permits the invitee to recover from the possessor for neg-
ligence. But when Rowland is combined with Elmore and 
the mentioned contractor cases, it is also probable that the 
invitee can recover from whoever causes the dangerous con-
dition of the premises leading to the injury, whether or not 
that person is the owner of the property. 
B. Theory of Liability 
Can such a plaintiff prevail only if he is able to show neg-
ligence, or may he rely on a theory of strict liability? Under 
the doctrine of strict liability, a person injured by use of a 
product may recover without showing that the manufac-
turer was guilty of negligence in its production, if the injured 
party can show it was defective and the manufacturer did not 
expect the injured party to inspect the product for defects.ll 
9. 49 Cal.2d 720, 726, 321 P.2d 736, 
739-740. 
10. 69 Cal.2d 108, 70 Cal. Rptr. 97, 
443 P.2d 561 (1968). For a full discus-
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sion of this case see Moreau, TORTS, 
Cal Law-Trends and Developments 
1969, p. 493. 
11. See Greenman v. Yuba Power 
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Between 1953 and 1968, strict liability was applied to al-
most every kind of tangible asset except land and houses. 
They were held not included because there is no warranty of 
fitness enumerated in section 1113 of the Civil Code, which 
was deemed to afford the sale basis for protecting purchasers.1s 
The big breakthrough of strict liability into real estate 
happened in 1969. After one false start,t3 the Court of Ap-
peal, in Kriegler v. Eichler Homes, Inc.14 held that a contrac-
tor could be strictly liable in tort to a remote purchaser for 
property damage resulting from a defective heating system 
that reduced the value of the property by over $5,000. The 
contrary arguments which had earlier pursuaded a different 
division of this Court, in Connolley v. BuZzt5-that the contrac-
tor was unable to limit his liability by express warranties 
and/or disclaimers, and that buyers had more opportunities 
to inspect-were rejected. Instead, the court brought in con-
siderations from a New Jersey case, Schipper v. Levitt, & Sons, 
Inc. 16 to the effect that buying a house from an advertised 
model entails as much reliance upon the developer's skill as 
when a car is bought, that there is no meaningful inspection 
by the average purchaser, and that injuries from the defect 
can best be borne by the contractor. 
Kriegler was decided early enough in 1969, for several other 
districts of the Courts of Appeal to apply it. The second dis-
trict did so in Avner v. Langridge Estates/7 extending Kriegler 
in two directions. The first direction was with regard to the 
product claimed defective, since here it was soil rather than a 
Products, Inc., 59 Cal.2d 57, 27 Cal. 
Rptr. 697, 377 P.2d 897, 13 A.L.R.3d 
1049 (1963). This doctrine represents 
a significant advance over the earlier 
"warranty" remedy of purchasers, since 
the niceties of the sales law do not have 
to be complied with by the plaintiff, and 
the defendant is unable to exculpate 
himself by contract. 
12. See, e.g. Gustafson v. Dunman, 
Inc., 204 Cal. App.2d 10, 22 Cal. Rptr. 
161 (1962). See generally, Dunham, 
Vendor's Obligation as to Fitness of 
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Land for a Particular Purpose, 37 Minn 
L. Rev. 108 (1953). 
13. Conolley v. Bull, 258 Cal. App. 
2d 183, 65 Cal. Rptr. 689 (1968). 
14. 269 Cal. App.2d 224, 74 Cal. 
Rptr. 749 (1969). 
15. 258 Cal. App.2d 183, 65 Cal. 
Rptr. 689 (1968). 
16. 44 N.J. 70, 207 A.2d 314 (1965). 
17. 272 Cal. App.2d 607, 695, 77 
Cal. Rptr. 633 (1969). 




house; instead of putting in a poor heating system, the defend-
ant put in poor fill, on which he then built a house. There 
were some tenable distinctions to be made between manufac-
turing houses and working with soil, but the Court held that 
modern earth-moving and testing techniques made the distinc-
tions irrelevant. 
The other direction of extension over Kriegler was less 
obvious but more important. In Kriegler, a great deal of sig-
nificance was put on the fact that Eichler was "mass produc-
ing" houses: 18 
We think, in terms of today's society, there are no mean-
ingful distinctions between Eichler's mass production 
and sale of homes and the mass production and sale of 
automobiles and that the pertinent overriding policy 
considerations are the same.19 
If strict liability were going to be imposed in the mass produc-
tion field alone, it might help people who bought Eichler or 
Levitt homes, but what about all those houses built and sold 
by the many little contractors who come into and out of the 
real estate market so rapidly?20 
In A vner, the defendant plainly graded more than one 
lot, but the Court gave no indication at all of how many lots. 
Kriegler was described and quoted, the fact of 4,000 homes 
was mentioned, but nothing was said about the number of 
homes this defendant built. 
It makes sense not to confine the rule to the big contractors. 
Buyers are as unable to inspect homes built by little contrac-
tors as big ones; they are forced to rely as much on the build-
er's expertise in either case, and there is no reason why big 
but not little contractors should bear the loss of their defects. 
It is possible that our Supreme Court, which has not yet 
passed on this question, will outlaw the application of strict 
18. Over 4,000 homes had radiant 
heating systems like the one involved 
in this case. 
19. 269 Cal. App.2d 224 at 227, 74 
Cal. Rptr. 749 at 752 (1969). 
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20. See Note, Liability of the Insti-
tutional Lender for Structural Defects 




liability to the real estate field. But this seems hardly probable 
in light of the way that the Courts of Appeal have been decid-
ing this precise question, and in light of the way the Supreme 
Court has extended the concepts of strict liability in the chat-
tel field and general liability in the real estate field. 
If strict liability now applies to real estate contractors, 
and if invitees can now recover from contractors for negli-
gence, it is hard to see why the courts will limit application 
of the theory to cases where the plaintiff is an owner and reject 
it where he is an invitee, in light of Rowland v. Christian l and 
Elmore v. American Motors Corp.2 But the question does 
remain whether this theory-in real estate at least-can do 
more than justify an award to an owner or guest for property 
damage caused by the property defect. Will personal injuries 
also be compensable? 
c. Measure of Damages 
In the chattel field, there is little question but that a person 
injured by a defective product can recover for both the cost 
of the damage to the product and for his own personal injuries. 
Since so many harm-producing chattels cost infinitesimally 
less than the amount of harm they do, not much attention is 
usually paid to compensation for loss to the product itself.3 
In real estate, the situation is often reversed; a defective heat-
ing system may cause only $10 worth of bodily injuries while 
requiring several thousand dollars to repair if it is built into 
the basic structure of the house. Thus there are at least as 
many cases going to court where the home owner is seeking 
the cost of repairs (or depreciation of property value) as where 
he is claiming for personal injuries. 
Both Kriegler v. Eichler4 and Avner v. Longridge Estates/ 
1. 69 Cal.2d 108, 70 Cal. Rptr. 97, N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916), also 
443 P.2d 561 (1968). wanted to recover the cost of the tire? 
2. 70 Cal.2d 578, 75 Cal. Rptr. 652, 4. 269 Cal. App.2d 224, 74 Cal. 
451 P.2d 84 (1969). Rptr. 749 (1969). 
3. Does anyone really know, or care, S. 272 Cal. App.2d 607, 77 Cal. 
for instance, whether the plaintiff in Rptr. 633 (1969). 
MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 
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the two strict-liability real estate cases in California, involved 
property damage only. So did Connor v. Great Western Sav-
ings and Loan,s now the main California case involving third-
party liability. If the next defect in a house causes more seri-
ous personal injuries than property damage, will the injured 
party be able to recover for these? 
The contractor negligence cases have been rather in-
different to the kind of loss involved. Hale v. Depaolf and 
Dow v. Holly Mfg. Co.s both gave personal injury awards 
against contractors for defective conditions. But the next 
Supreme Court case, Stewart v. COX,9 used precisely the same 
logic to justify an award for properly damage (in the amount 
of $25,000) resulting from a defective swimming pool. The 
case could apparently have involved a drowning as easily as 
water leakage. Finally, in Sabella v. Wisler/o where another 
property damage award was upheld, the Supreme Court did 
observe that negligence by the contractor would permit a 
recovery for either personal injuries or property damage. 
But it may be one thing to say that negligence permits re-
covery for either damage and another to say that a recovery 
in strict liability can include whatever loss results. ll How-
ever, reverting to the chattel field, the Supreme Court has told 
us that bodily and property damage are both compensable 
under a theory of strict liability. 
Plaintiff contends that, even though the law of warranty 
governs the economic relations between the parties, the 
doctrine of strict liability in tort should be extended to 
govern physical injury to plaintiff's property, as well as 
personal injury. We agree with this contention. Phys-
6. 69 Ca1.2d 850, 73 Cal. Rptr. 369, 
447 P.2d 609 (1968). See section II D 
infra. 
7. 33 Cal.2d 228, 201 P.2d 1, 13 
A.L.R.2d 183 (1948). 
8. 49 Cal.2d 720, 321 P.2d 736 
(1958). 
9. 55 Cal.2d 857, 13 Cal. Rptr. 521, 
362 P.2d 345 (1961). 
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10. 59 Cal.2d 21, 27 Cal. Rptr. 689, 
377 P.2d 889 (1963). 
11. On the other hand, it is probable 
that, on the basis of the four cases just 
mentioned and those discussed in sec-
tion IIA, supra, a contractor who is neg-
ligent may be liable both to the owner 
for property damage and to the invitee 
for personal injuries. 
397 
Real Property 
ical injury to property is so akin to personal injury that 
there is no reason for distinguishing them. 12 
And in the New Jersey case of Schipper v. Levitt & Sons, 
Inc.,13 under a strict liability theory, a tenant in a home pur-
chased from the builder was allowed to recover for personal 
injuries caused to his child by a defective hot water heater. 
There was no discussion at all of the question of whether the 
contractor's strict liability was limited to property damage. 
Schipper v. Levitt is important in California, not only because 
it has been cited with approval in three cases,14 but also because 
it itself was based in large part on the California decisions 
of Dow v. Holly Mfg. CO. 15 and Greenman v. Yuba Power 
Products,lnc. 16 
These three considerations: (a) that contractors are liable 
for personal and property damage when negligent; (b) that 
suppliers of chattels are liable for both kinds of loss under a 
strict liability theory; and (c) that contractors are now held 
strictly liable for defective houses, make it almost inevitable 
that the damages recovered from contractors under a theory 
of strict liability will not be limited to property losses. Nor 
in light of Rowland v. Christianl7 and Elmore v. American 
Motors Corp.18 will recoveries for personal injuries based on 
a strict liability theory be confined to home owners, tenants, 
or other possessors of land; even invitees will collect. The 
question remaining is whether these plaintiffs can recover 
such damages under a strict liability theory when a third-
party lender is the defendant. 
12. Seely v. White Motor Co., 63 
Ca1.2d 9, 18, 45 Cal. Rptr. 17, 24, 403 
P.2d 145, 151 (1965). The reference to 
"economic relations" referred to the 
plaintiff's claim for lost profits. The 
court held he could recover only on a 
warranty theory for them. 
13. 44 N.J. 70, 207 A.2d 314 (1965). 
14. Connor v. Great Western Sav-
ings and Loan, 69 Cal.2d 850, 73 Cal. 
Rptr. 369, 447 P.2d 609 (1968), 
Kriegler v. Eichler Homes, Inc. 269 
398 
Cal. App.2d 224, 74 Cal. Rptr. 
749 (1969), Avner v. Longridge Estates, 
272 Cal. App.2d 607, 77 Cal. Rptr. 
633 (1969). 
15. 49 Cal.2d 720, 321 P.2d 736 
(1958). 
16. 59 Ca1.2d 57, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697, 
377 P.2d 897, 13 A.L.R.3d 1049 (1963). 
17. 69 Cal.2d 108,70 Cal. Rptr. 97, 
443 P.2d 561 (1968). 
18. 70 Cal.2d 578, 75 Cal. Rptr. 652, 
451 P.2d 84 (1969). 
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D. Parties Defendant 
In order to be held liable for a defect in property, a third 
party need not necessarily have himself caused the condition 
to exist. Third parties aware of adverse information concern-
ing the property may have a duty to disclose such facts to 
prospective purchasers, or sometimes may even have a duty to 
discover these conditions when specially employed to do so. 
Thus termite inspectors, soil engineers, and surveyors have 
been held liable for misrepresentation, nondisclosure, or negli-
gent misrepresentation to purchasers who relied on their skill 
and/or knowledge. 19 Lenders, too, have been held liable to 
purchasers for misstatements.~o Generally these cases sdund 
in fraud, which carries, as a special measure of damages, the 
difference between the price paid and the value of the proper-
ty, l but the duty to warn may be treated as a duty of care2 
with the result that personal injuries become compensable 
under a negligence theory.3 
In addition to fraud/negligence liability based on fail-
ure to warn, third parties may also be found liable under 
two other theories. On the one hand, they may be held liable 
under a rule of imputed liability, being charged with respon-
sibility for what someone else did or did not do. Or, on the 
other hand, they may be charged with a duty of their own to 
take steps to avoid the creation of a defective condition, even 
though the condition was not brought about by their "direct" 
acts. Both of these latter theories underwent great expansion 
in 1969, when applied to real estate lending institutions. In 
two cases, decided on the same day, the State Supreme Court 
put the lending industry into a state of shock. 
19. See e.g. Gagne v. Bertran, 43 
Cal.2d 481, 275 P.2d 15 (1954); Wice 
v. Schilling, 124 Cal. App.2d 735, 269 
P.2d 231 (1954); Roberts v. Karr, 178 
Cal. App.2d 535, 3 Cal. Rptr. 98 
(1960); Greenberg v. Hastie, 202 Cal. 
App.2d 159, 20 Cal. Rptr. 747 (1962); 
Hardy v. Carmichael, 207 Cal. App.2d 
218, 24 Cal. Rptr. 475 (1962); McCau-
ley v. Dennis, 220 Cal. App.2d 627, 34 
Cal. Rptr. 90 (1963). 
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20. See, e.g., De Zemplen v. Home 
Federal Savings and Loan, 221 Cal. 
App.2d 197, 34 Cal. Rptr. 334 (1963). 
1. Civ. Code § 3343. 
2. Not a duty to correct the defect, 
but a duty to discover it and inform 
the plaintiff about it. 
3. See Merrill v. Buck, 58 Cal.2d 




Morgan v. Reasor Corp.4 was one of these two cases. 
There, the plaintiffs gave a contractor a note and deed of trust 
to secure payment for a house he was to construct on their 
land, and the contractor then transferred the paper to a finance 
company. The plaintiffs sued both the contractor and the 
finance company, claiming that the documents did not comply 
with the Unruh Act,5 and they won. 
The Supreme Court first held that a construction contract 
came within the Unruh Act. Although a Court of Appeal 
had earlier intimated that this might be the case,6 the real 
estate industry had generally assumed that the Act did not 
apply to it. The legislature promptly repealed this part of the 
opinion by enacting Civil Code 1801.4,7 which eliminated 
most construction contracts from the scope of the· Act. 8 
For purposes of this article, that part of the holding was less 
important than what the Supreme Court did next. The pur-
chasers were asserting nonliability for any interest payments 
against a finance company which claimed to be a holder in due 
course. Would Unruh Act defenses apply? The answer was 
yes, for two reasons. First, the Court held that the policy 
of the Unruh Act compelled making an assignee of the paper 
responsible for its assignor's violations of the Act so long as the 
assignee had constructive notice of the violation. Second, and 
more important, the Court restated a rule it had made long 
earlier, that a finance company might be denied holder-in-due-
4. 69 Cal.2d 881, 73 Cal. Rptr. 398, 
447 P.2d 638 (1968). For further dis-
cussion of this case, see McCall, COM-
MERCIAL TRANSACTIONS, in this volume. 
S. Civil Code 1801 et. seq. 
6. Mann v. Earls, 226 Cal. App.2d 
155, 37 Cal. Rptr. 877 (1964). 
7. The provisions of this chapter shall 
not apply to any contract or series of 
contracts providing for the construction, 
sale, or construction and sale of an 
entire residence or all or part of a struc-
ture designed for cOl!lmercial or indus-
trial occupancy, with or without a par-
cel of real property or an interest there-
400 
in, or for the sale of a lot or parcel of 
real property, including any site prepa-
ration incidental to such sale. This act 
is intended to abrogate any contrary 
rule in Morgan v. Reasor Corp. 69 Cal. 
2d 881, 73 Cal. Rptr. 398, 447 P2d 638 
(1968). 
8. Had this part of the decision not 
been overturned, its sweep would have 
been immense. It would probably have 
applied to every sale in a real estate 
development where the house was not 
completed at the time the purchasers 
agreed to buy. 
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course status when it is so closely related to the seller/assignor 
as to create an agency relationship between them.9 
The first argument may be ignored since it turns on the 
Unruh Act, which now no longer applies to most real estate 
transactions. But the second argument does not depend on 
the Act and may have repercussions far beyond it. The Court 
furnished a list of instances where the contractor might be 
deemed the finance company's agent: 
If Midwest (the finance company) had provided IBC 
(the contractor) with forms for bills of sale or notes, 
that conduct would strongly suggest the required expec-
tation, but the record contains no showing of any such 
arrangement. If Midwest had purchased a substantial 
number of such notes from IBC in the past, that factor 
too would weigh heavily, but plaintiffs do not establish 
any such practice. If Midwest's name had been on the 
note when the buyer signed it, or if Midwest had inquired 
into the buyer's credit rating, such evidence would in-
dicate that IBC contemplated Midwest's acquisition of 
the note, but neither of these factors was present. If 
IBC had assigned the note to Midwest on the day plain-
tiffs executed it, such assignment might have raised a 
presumption as to IBC's expectations, but we know only 
that IBC assigned the note within three months.lO 
Many of these conditions fairly describe the relationship 
between a savings and loan institution and the speculative 
contractor developing a tract. Not only is the money for land 
acquisition and construction advanced, but there is then an 
arrangement between the parties for the handling of all pur-
chase money loans on the individual houses. It is not even a 
question of purchasing the individual notes and deeds of trust, 
since they are made out in favor of the savings and loan asso-
ciation from the start. The Supreme Court has elsewhere 
held that a savings and loan association and a developer 
9. See Commercial Credit Corpora-
tion v. Orange County Machine Works, 
34 Cal.2d 766, 214 P.2d 819 (1950). 
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10. 69 Cal.2d 881 at 895,896, 73 
Cal. Rptr. 398 at 407-408, 447 P.2d 
638 at 647-648 (1968). 
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are normally not Jomt venturers,ll but Morgan v. Reasor 
Corp.12 seems to indicate strongly that they may be principal 
and agent nevertheless. 
All that Morgan held was that a finance company too close 
to the contractor may be denied holder-in-due-course protec-
tion. But may it be affirmatively liable for damages for 
defective construction? The practical difference between 
these two issues is perhaps not as large as it seems. A pur-
chaser who has a claim against his seller for some physical 
condition of the property, and who also owes the seller money 
for the balance of the price, may offset one against the other if 
he is successful in court.13 If that same offset can be asserted 
against the lending institution on the ground that the seller 
acted as agent for the lender, and if the extent of the damage 
does not exceed the amount of the loan, the buyer needs no 
further protection. 
Defenses which the Court held applicable to the finance 
company in Morgan were those relating to the contractor's 
failure to comply with the Unruh Act in the preparation of the 
contract documents. Can defenses relating to the contrac-
tor's work on the job also be charged to the lending institution 
behind him? Nothing in the opinion indicated that the deci-
sion was intended to have a limited scope. One statement 
the Court made is particularly interesting: 
The important function of section 1812.7 becomes par-
ticularly apparent in the case of a seller inclined fre-
quently to violate the act. We recognize that stringent 
enforcement of section 1812.7 will tend to compel such 
a retailer to sell his paper at a greater discount and to 
charge a proportionately higher price for his goods. 
In all likelihood, this increase in retail prices will deter 
customers from dealing with such a seller. Moreover, 
such enforcement will effectuate a proper allocation 
of possible financial loss. The impact of the violations 
U. See Connor v. Great Western 12. 69 AC. 919, 69 Cal.2d 881, 73 
Savings and Loan Association, 69 Cal. Cal. Rptr. 398, 447 P.2d 638 (1968). 
2d 850, 73 Cal. Rptr. 369, 447 P.2d 13. Cf. Lenard v. Edmonds, 151 Cal. 
609 (1968), infra. App.2d 764, 312 P.2d 308 (1957). 
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will be borne, not by a few consumers unable to pass on 
the loss or in any way "insure" against the effect of a 
harsh contract, but by finance companies that buy large 
numbers of notes. Such financiers are obviously better 
able than buyers to absorb the loss of an occasional bad 
deal. Finally, strict enforcement will give finance com-
panies with the knowledge and economic leverage re-
quired effectively to police against Unruh Act violations, 
an incentive to do SO.14 
Compare this to the language of the same Court a few years 
earlier in Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co./5 where a dealer 
was held strictly liable along with the manufacturer for a de-
fective vehicle. 
Retailers, like manufacturers, are engaged in the busi-
ness of distributing goods to the pUblic. They are an 
integral part of the overall producing and marketing 
enterprise that should bear the cost of injuries resulting 
from defective products . . . . In some cases the re-
tailer may be the only member of that enterprise reason-
ably available to the injured plaintiff. In other cases 
the retailer himself may playa substantial part in insur-
ing that the product is safe or may be in a position to 
exert pressure on the manufacturer to that end; the re-
tailer's strict liability thus serves as an added incentive 
to safety. Strict liability on the manufacturer and re-
tailer alike affords maximum protection to the injured 
plaintiff and works no injustice to the defendants, for they 
can adjust the costs of such protection between them in 
the course of their continuing business relationship.I6 
The quotation from Vandermark manifestly invites con-
sideration of whether Morgan v. Reason Corp.I7 may not only 
be extended from Unruh Act violations to negligent construc-
14. 69 Cal.2d 881 at 889-891, 73 
Cal. Rptr. 398 at 404, 447 P.2d 638 
at 644 (1968). 
15. 61 Cal.2d 256, 37 Cal. Rptr. 896, 
391 P.2d 168 (1964). 
CAL LAW 1970 
16. 61 Cal.2d 256 at 262, 263, 37 
Cal. Rptr. 896 at 899-900, 391 P.2d 
168 at 171-172. 
17. 69 Cal.2d 881, 73 Cal. Rptr. 
398, 447 P.2d 638 (1968). 
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tion but in fact even lead to the imposition of strict liability on 
real estate construction lenders for defects in the finished 
product. The tests of Vandermark appear to be better met 
by the construction lender than by the automobile retailer: 
( 1). The savings and loan industry is an integral part of 
the manufacturing and marketing of houses. These institu-
tions are far more indispensable to the real estate industry than 
are finance companies in the automobile field. 18 They enter 
the picture before construction begins (with their acquisition 
and construction loans) and stay there long after it is com-
pleted (with their home purchase-money loans). 
(2). Real estate lending institutions are often the only 
member of the home-producing enterprise reasonably available 
to injured plaintiffs. As has already been pointed out, con-
tractors are not like automobile manufacturers, but flourish in 
far greater numbers, on a more petty and transient basis. 
(3). Savings and loans can play a substantial part in 
insuring that the finished product-the house-is safe. Unlike 
finance companies, they are more concerned with the value 
of the product than with the plant and assets of the manufac-
turer,19 particularly in California, because of the antideficiency 
laws. Unlike automobile dealers, they are there at the begin-
ning of construction, at least when a construction loan is made. 
The terms of their loan agreements permit them to supervise 
construction, and withhold progress payments when it is not to 
their satisfaction.20 They maintain their own staff of experts, 
often more diligent than municipal building inspectors. 
( 4 ). These institutions can easily adjust the cost of protec-
tion with the contractor merely by requiring insurance or the 
posting of a bond. 
One obstacle to applying the Vandermark doctrine of vicari-
18. See Lefcoe and Dobson, Savings 
Associations as Land Developers, 75 
Yale L.J. 1271 (1966). 
19. See Note, Torts-Lender's Tor-
tious Liability for Building Defects, 
1968 Wise. L. Rev. 600. 
20. See Note, Torts-Building and 
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experienced, Undercapitalized Builder 
is Under a duty to Protect Home Buy-
ers in the Project from Major Structural 
Defects. 37 U. Cine. L. Rev. 219, 
(1968 ). 
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ous strict liability to the savings and loan institution is that 
nowhere in California has a finance company been held strictly 
liable in the chattel field. Vandermark involved a dealer, and 
distinctions can be made between dealers and finance com-
panies. But even if such distinctions will work in the chattel 
field, it is unlikely to work in the real estate field in light of 
the Supreme Court's companion decision to Morgan, Connor 
v. Great Western Savings and Loan. l 
In Connor, an inexperienced and undercapitalized contrac-
tor worked out a scheme to build and sell 2,000 homes in 
Southern California. To finance the plan, he worked out an 
arrangement with Great Western Savings & Loan whereby 
it was to purchase part of the land and warehouse it for him 
until he could pay for it out of the loans it made to him. Great 
Western profited from a markup on the resale and from the 
fact that all construction and ultimate purchase-money loans 
had to be made by it. The only drawback to the arrangement 
was that it left the contractor with so little money that he was 
forced to cut dangerous corners in construction. 
One such corner was soil conditions. The houses were 
built on adobe soil, which can expand five times when wet 
and therefore requires special construction techniques which, 
sadly, were not employed. The result was inevitable: pur-
chasers found their homes cracking, and sued. They sued not 
only the contractor, but also Great Western. 
The purchasers were nonsuited in the trial court, but had 
much better luck at the appellate level. The Court of Appeal 
held, in 1967, that Great Western had a duty to the purchasers 
to protect them from defective construction because it had 
undertaken to provide almost total financing to a bad-risk 
contractor.2 The Supreme Court also held Great Western 
1. 69 Cal.2d 850, 73 Cal. Rptr. 369, 
447 P.2d 609 (1968). "Companion" is 
perhaps too strong. Both cases were 
decided on the same day and stand next 
to each other in the reports. Curiously 
enough, however, neither refers to the 
other. 
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liable, less for its near-total financing than for the enthusiastic 
role it played in the project. 
In undertaking these relationships, Great Western be-
came much more than a lender content to lend money 
at interest on the security of real property. It became 
an active participant in a home construction enterprise 
. . . . Its financing, which made the enterprise pos-
sible, took on ramifications beyond the domain of the 
usual money lender. It received not only interest on its 
construction loans, but also substantial fees for making 
them, a 20 percent capital gain for "warehousing" the 
land, and protection from loss of profits in the event in-
dividual home buyers sought permanent financing else-
where. 
Great Western was held to be under a duty to its own share-
holders to avoid construction of defective homes; it was held 
to have breached that duty through careless inspections; and 
that breach was held to make it liable to the purchasers of the 
homes even though there was no privity between them. 
One paragraph of the opinion is particularly significant be-
cause it echoes so much the logic of Vandermark when that 
case extended strict liability to the third parties: 
By all the foregoing tests, Great Western had a duty to 
exercise reasonable care to prevent the construction and 
sale of seriously defective homes to plaintiffs. The coun-
tervailing considerations invoked by Great Western and 
amici curiae are that the imposition of the duty in ques-
tion upon a lender will increase housing costs, drive mar-
ginal builders out of business, and decrease total housing 
at a time of great need. These are conjectural claims. 
In any event, there is no enduring social utility in foster-
ing the construction of seriously defective homes. If re-
liable construction is the norm, the recognition of a duty 
on the part of tract financiers to home buyers should not 
materially increase the cost of housing or drive small 
3. 69 Cal.2d 850, 864, 73 Cal. Rptr. 
369, 376, 447 P.2d 609, 616. 
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builders out of business. If existing sanctions are inade-
quate, imposition of a duty at the point of effective finan-
cial control of tract building will insure responsible build-
ing practices. Moreover, in either event the losses of 
family savings invested in seriously defective homes 
would be devastating economic blows if no redress were 
available. 4 
Were Connor the last work on the subject to date, the future 
would have been fairly clear. The similarity between the Con-
nor and Vandermark policies is great enough to argue that 
strict liability would replace negligence as the basis of liability 
since the policing of the construction industry can be accom-
plished more effectively thereby. The distinction between 
property damage and personal injuries would not last long, in 
light of the way strict liability developed in the chattel field 
and negligence grew in the real estate field, so that a buyer 
who suffered personal injuries from the defect could also re-
cover from the construction lender. In light of Rowland v. 
Christian5 and Elmore v. American Motors,6 invitees would 
also soon be able to recover for harm done to them. And 
finally, with Morgan v. Reasor Corp.7 as a basis, savings and 
loan institutions would be subject to liability even when they 
had not engaged in "lending plus," as had Great Western, but 
had merely made a regular construction loan to a developer.8 
This last prediction, however, appears to have been demol-
ished by the action of the legislature in its quick enactment 
of Civil Code section 3434: 9 
A lender who makes a loan of money, the proceeds of 
which are used or may be used by the borrower to finance 
the design, manufacture, construction, repair, modifica-
tion or improvement of real or personal property for sale 
or lease to others, shall not be held liable to third persons 
4. 69 Cal.2d 850, 867-868, 73 Cal. 7. 69 Cal.2d 881, 73 Cal. Rptr. 398, 
Rptr. 369, 378, 447 P.2d 609, 618. 447 P.2d 638 (1968). 
5. 69 Cal.2d 108, 70 Cal. Rptr. 97, 8. But see Bradler v. Craig, 274 Cal. 
443 P.2d 561 (1968). App.2d -, 79 Cal. Rptr. 401 (1969). 
6. 70 Cal.2d 578, 75 Cal. Rptr. 652, 9. Stats 1969, Ch. 1584, § I. 
451 P.2d 84 (1969). 
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for any loss or damage occasioned by any defect in the 
real or personal property so designed, manufactured, 
constructed, repaired, modified or improved or for any 
loss or damage resulting from the failure of the borrower 
to use due care in the design, manufacture, construction, 
repair, modification or improvement of such real or per-
sonal property, unless such loss or damage is a result 
of an act of the lender outside the scope of the activities 
of a lender of money or unless the lender has been a party 
to misrepresentations with respect to such real or per-
sonal property. 
Unlike the partial repeal of Morgan v. Reasor Corp.l0 by 
section 1801.4, section 3434, does not abrogate any part of 
the Connor holding or abolish any previous judicial rules 
concerning lenders. Lenders are still liable when they exceed 
their traditional functions or when they engage in fraud. But 
merely by limiting Connor to its facts, the legislature has 
worked a far greater limitation here than it did in repealing 
Morgan. It was inevitable that had section 3434, not been 
enacted, the courts would soon have forgotten the fact that 
the savings and loan association in Connor had gone beyond 
a lender's normal role, because it was in fact irrelevant to the 
holding. Probably the main justification for imposing on 
lending institutions responsibility for carelessly inspecting their 
projects is the fact that they normally inspect them anyway. 
Even when the lender stays entirely within its normal bounds, 
it will be concerned-for the preservation of the security for 
its loan-with the quality of the job. ll Thus its responsibility, 
and duty, is no greater in one case than the other. Just as 
the mass-production test of strict liability for contractors will 
vanish because in fact it has nothing to do with the real issues 
involved, so too would the excesses of the construction lender. 
Nothing in section 3434, prohibits the development of strict 
liability, or the protection of invitees, or the recovery for per-
10. 69 Cal.2d 881, 73 Cal. Rptr. 
398, 447 P.2d 638 (1968). 
U. This is disputed by the lending 
industry. See Pfeiler, Lender's Liability 
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in Tract Financing, U.S.S. & L. Bull., 
85 (Mar., 1969); but see Torts-
Lender's T ortiolls Liability tor Bllild-
ing Defects, 1968 Wise. L. Rev. 600. 
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sonal injuries in the real estate field. But by limiting the 
lender's liability to cases where it does more than lend money, 
these other developments look better on paper than in reality. 
A judgment in favor of a guest in a strict liability case for his 
injuries against a defunct contractor is not the goal of most 
attorneys. And, even apart from the threat of section 3434, 
lending institutions are not-in the foreseeable future- going 
to move out of the lending arena and into the development 
field. Connor was a product of the plentiful money situation 
a few years back when the financial industry was almost forced 
into participation in development with speculators in order 
to rid themselves of the great reserves of cash coming into their 
coffers. The prospect today of inducing a savings and loan 
association into participating in a speculative development is 
virtually nonexistent. 
It is too bad that the legislature cut off the opportunity 
for the courts to develop a scheme of adequate protection for 
owners and users of homes. It means that again the growth 
of protection in the real estate field will lag behind that devel-
oping for every other product. The statute may have been 
the result of visions by the lending industry of enormous new 
liabilities confronting them. But these fears were hardly that 
legitimate. No one expected lender's liability to reach every 
trivial defect in a house, but only those which a reasonable 
inspection might have uncovered.12 Asking lenders to make 
reasonable inspections when they presumably are doing so 
anyway does not appear to create any costly new duties. And 
even if it does entail some expense (by way of higher interest), 
it is an expense most of the public will be glad to bear as pay-
ment for the protection an expanded liability would afford 
them. 
12. See Lefcoe and Dobson, Savings 
Associations as Land Developers, 75 
Yale L.J. 1271 (1966). 
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In. Brokers and Their Commissions 
A. Listings 
The 1968 California Real Estate Association Exclusive 
Listing Form ("Exclusive Authorization and Right to Sell") 
provides that the listing broker will receive --% of the 
selling price if the property is sold during the listing period, 
or --% of the asking price if during that period the prop-
erty is withdrawn from sale, transferred, conveyed or leased 
without the consent of the broker, or if the vendor voluntarily 
made the title "marketable."13 This is not the only way this 
clause could have been worded. The San Francisco Real Es-
tate Board Multiple Listing Form, for instance, differs in two 
respects: by using only the selling price as the measure of 
compensation and by adding that a commission is also payable 
if the broker's authority is revoked during the period. 
Several 1969 cases illustrate how important such textual 
variations may be. Although both forms provide equal and 
ample protection to the broker when the owner bypasses him 
in a sale of the property while a listing is in effect,14 problems 
arise if something other than a sale occurs. In Al Herd, 
Inc. v. Isaac/ 5 the broker used a Los Angeles listing agreement 
similar to the San Francisco form, and during the listing pe-
riod the owner leased the property to a party originally con-
tacted by the broker. Since the listing provided for payment 
of a commission in the event of withdrawal, transfer, or lease 
by the owner, it did not matter that the broker himself was 
never authorized to lease the property-he was still entitled to 
a commission. Therefore, the Court of Appeal reversed the 
trial court's decision against the broker. But since the form 
based the commission on the selling price, it was necessary 
to remand the case to decide whether a commission should be 
measured by the listing price, the value of the lease, or the cus-
13. Undoubtedly, "unmarketable" was 15. 271 Cal. App.2d 749, 76 Cal. 
intended. Rptr. 697 (1969). 
14. See Berzon v. U.L.C. Corp. 274 
Cal. App. 2d -, 79 Cal. Rptr. 277 
(1969). 
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tomary commission in such cases. Had the parties used the 
CREA form instead, the broker would have been simply en-
titled to a percentage of the listing price regardless of the value 
of the lease or custom. 
On the other hand, a drawback of the CREA form was 
revealed in Never v. King/6 where a loan broker's authority 
was prematurely revoked. His listing was similar to the 
CREA form in that it did not make a commission specifically 
payable on revocation. As a result, the Court of Appeal re-
jected the broker's claim for a commission and declared that 
he could recover only those damages he could actually prove.17 
Earlier cases awarding a full commission after revocation were 
distinguished because the listing agreements there had so pro-
vided. Thus, here, had the San Francisco version been 
used, the broker's claim would have been measurably stronger, 
although the language of the opinion was such that the pos-
sibility is real that these older cases may no longer be fol-
lowed. 
B. Deposit Receipts 
As if brokers did not have enough commISSIon problems 
under the standard listing forms, they go farther and create 
new problems by signing deposit receipts that radically affect 
the amount of compensation to be paid in certain circum-
stances. IS Barton v. White Oak Realty, Inc. I9 is a good ex-
ample. 
To understand Barton, one must understand a vendor's 
rights against a defaulting purchaser under a deposit receipt. 
If a purchaser defaults and the vendor resells elsewhere for a 
higher price, the purchaser may have restitution of his down-
payment, less any amount actually paid by the vendor to the 
16. 276 Cal. App.2d -, 81 Cal. 
Rptr. 161 (1969). 
17. None were. 
18. The new deposit form of the 
California Real Estate Association states 
that the broker can collect "one half 
that portion of the damages collected 
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. . ." by the vendor. The older 
form provided that the broker could 
collect one-half the forfeited deposit. 
19. 271 Cal. App.2d 579, 76 Cal. 
Rptr. 587 (1969). For further discus-
sion of this case, see York, REMEDIES, 
in this volume. 
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broker handling the aborted sale.20 But under Royer v. 
Carter/ if there is no profitable resale, and the vendor sues 
the purchaser for damages for breach of contract, one item 
of special damages he may recover is the difference between: 
( 1) the expenses he would have incurred had he resold the 
property at its market value on the date of breach; and (2) any 
expenses he was saved from incurring when the original sale 
failed. 2 
Barton showed that the Royer rule of vendor's damages also 
bears on the broker's right to recover his commission after a 
default. Here the defaulting purchaser sued to recover her 
deposit, the vendor cross-complained for damages, and the 
brokers also cross-complained against the purchaser for their 
full commission. The trial court denied restitution to the pur-
chaser, awarded difference value damages to the vendor, and 
held the purchaser liable to the brokers for their commission. 
The brokers' theory was as follows: (1) by suing the pur-
chaser for damages, the vendor becomes automatically liable 
to the broker for a full commission; (2) since the vendor is 
obligated for a commission to the broker, he can recover that 
much from the purchaser; (3) since the vendor owes the bro-
ker and the purchaser owes the vendor the same amount, the 
broker can go directly against the purchaser for his commis-
sion. 
The Court of Appeal found this theory wrong in two re-
spects. First, it proceeded on the false premise that the vendor 
could recover the full commission from the purchaser when-
ever he was liable for it to the broker. Since Royer v. Cartera 
gives the purchaser the expenses of a hypothetical second sale 
less the savings of real expenses from the first sale, it cannot be 
maintained that the vendor can sue his purchaser for the actual 
expenses of the first sale.4 
20. See Freedman v. The Rector, 37 
Cal.2d 16, 230 P.2d 629, 31 A.L.R.2d 
1 (195\). 
1. 37 Cal.2d 544, 233 P.2d 539 
(1951). 
2. Such as paying the broker only 
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half of the deposit instead of the full 
commission. 
3. 37 Cal.2d 544, 233 P.2d 539 
(195\). 
4. Under the Royer formula, a ven-
dor liable for the full commission to 
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If the second premise of the broker's theory is wrong (be-
cause a vendor cannot recover from the purchaser what he 
owes the broker), then the first premise also fails. Since a 
vendor's recovery from the purchaser is reduced by whatever 
savings he makes on first-sale expenses, it cannot be held that 
he becomes liable for all first-sale expenses the moment he sues 
the purchaser, because such full liability would automatically 
eliminate any possibility of a saving. In other words, whether 
the vendor is liable for a full commission after an aborted sale 
may depend on his contract with the broker, but it does not 
depend on whether or not he sues the purchaser. Precisely 
because the extent of the purchaser's liability to the vendor 
depends on the extent of the vendor's liability to the broker, 
the extent of that liability to the broker cannot (circularly) 
depend on the purchaser's liability to the vendor. The ques-
tion of liability to the broker must be determined independ-
ently.5 
However, this rejected circularity is exactly what the new 
CREA deposit receipt attempts to introduce into the picture. 
The listing agreement gives the broker a fraction of the selling 
price, and there is no adjustment for an aborted sale. The 
older forms of deposit receipt modified this to give the broker 
a share of the forfeited deposit. But the new form gives the 
broker one-half of the damages collected by the vendor from 
the purchaser. This is an impossible number. The vendor's 
recovery from the purchaser depends indirectly on his liabil-
ity to the broker (under Royer v. Carter),6 but now the 
vendor's liability to the broker (under the new deposit receipt) 
will depend on how much he recovers from the purchaser. Not 
even a computer could work this out. Brokers would be far 
better off not signing deposit receipts and staying with their 
listing agreements. 
the broker, even though the sale failed, 
would have no savings from the sale 
that could be offset against the hypo-
thetical expenses of the resale. But that 
is not the same as giving him the real 
expenses of the first sale. 
5. The third premise of the broker's 
theory was not examined and may be 
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of liability of the purchaser to the ven-
dor. 




IV. Landlord and Tenant 
In two decisions this year, the State Supreme Court under-
took exhaustive analysis of some problems commonly faced by 
landlords and tenants. 
A. Repairs 
The first case, Glenn R. Sewell Sheet Metal, Inc. v. 
Loverde,7 involved an argument between a landlord and a 
tenantS as to which had to pay the cost of alterations required 
to bring the premises up to Code. The landlord had some 
lease clauses in his favor, but the tenant was unwilling to do 
the work in light of the fact that it would cost $7500 when 
he had only eleven months remaining on his three-year lease 
at $600 rent per month. The Supreme Court held that a 
landlord is responsible for such costs except in three situa-
tions: first, the tenant has the duty to make small repairs 
arising from his ordinary use of the premises (similar to the 
common-law duty to avoid waste); second, the tenant must 
bear the entire cost of making the premises conform to Code 
when it is his new use of the premises which subjects them 
to hitherto inapplicable Code requirements; third, the tenant 
must bear the cost when he covenants to do so in his lease. 
All three exceptions are new since there has been almost no 
litigation in California on this matter, but the third exception 
is obviously the most important, since it may tell landlords 
how to draft printed form leases for maximum protection. 
On the issue of drafting, the Court first held that a provi-
sion merely promising compliance to all laws by the tenant 
does not compel him to do "substantial" curative work. A 
Court of Appeal had previously reached a similar result in 
Browning v. Aymard,9 stating that such a covenant did not 
require the tenant to do any rebuilding or building of a new 
facility. But the Supreme Court did not utilize the rebuilding/ 
repair test. "Substantial" went consciously undefined, al-
7. 70 Cal.2d 666, 75 Cal. Rptr. 889, 9. 224 Cal. App.2d 277, 36 Cal. 
451 P.2d 721 (1969). Rptr 604 (1964). 
8. Actually a tenant and subtenant. 
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though a footnote indicated that the word usually serves as a 
conclusionary label for considerations such as the cost of the 
work (compared to the rent), the length of the lease, the bene-
ficiary of the improvement, the extent to which the work will 
interfere with the tenant's enjoyment of the premises, and 
whether the parties contemplated the matter. The Court was 
careful, however, to avoid indicating whether these· tests will 
be the ones applied when such a covenant to comply is the 
only relevant clause in the lease.1o 
In this case, however, there was no need to stop with the 
covenant to comply. The Court held there were enough other 
factors present to permit shifting the risk for the required work 
to the tenant. The additional factors were: ( 1) an "as is" 
clause in the lease; (2) another clause relieving the landlord 
of any duty to repair or maintain the improvements; (3) a 
third clause compelling the tenant to assume all risks of injury 
by virtue of his use of the premises and to indemnify the land-
lord in this respect; (4) the character of the premises; (5) 
the testimony of the parties. 
The last two factors were not stated very persuasively by 
the Court, which may make them all the more significant. 
They may well have been included to keep landlords from 
thinking that they need only amplify their covenant-to-comply 
language to include the other three clauses in order to make 
tenants responsible for everything. When that is the case, the 
Court may hold that by virtue of the nature of the premises 
(e.g. a single apartment in a large building) or the parol evi-
dence offered (e.g. that the landlord made promises to repair 
some defect), the language is not effective to make the tenant 
bear the costs of expensive work required by the city or county. 
Another related question not discussed by the Court is 
whether a landlord will be liable for personal injuries caused 
to third persons by uncorrected code violations. In Finnegan 
v. Royal Realty, 11 the Supreme Court held that a land-
10. Query: Would the tests then be 11. 35 Cal.2d 409, 218 P.2d 17 
obviated by a covenant to comply that (1950). 
states that "substantial" repairs were 
also included? 
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lord has a nondelegable duty in tort to comply with the Code. 
Although Glenn Sewell shows that the duty is obviously dele-
gable as a matter of contract, it is doubtful whether this would 
be a defense in tort when invitees are injured.12 It is also 
doubtful that Glenn Sewell has overruled Finnegan. More 
likely is the possibility that Finnegan has been modified sub 
silentio by Rowland v. Christian/3 so that a covenant between· 
landlord and tenant will be held to be merely evidence bearing 
on the question of a landlord's negligence. 
If the Supreme Court has second thoughts about Glenn 
Sewell later, it will be easy to keep the holding of the case 
narrow. It does not say that the landlord may compel a tenant 
to make an improvement. All the.case really "holds" is that a 
tenant may not abandon the premises and be excused from the 
rent when a local authority orders that operations cease unless 
changes in the premises are made. 
B. Forcible Entry 
The other important case, Daluiso v. Boone,14 did not even 
involve a landlord and tenant, but undoubtedly will have its 
greatest effect on these parties. There one landowner forcibly 
tore down his neighbor's encroaching fence, causing the neigh-
bor to have a heart attack. Preexisting case law gave the 
stricken neighbor two options. He could bring a statutory 
action for forcible entry, in which event he would merely have 
to prove that he was in peaceable possession and that the de-
fendant used some "force" to enter (the amount would be 
irrelevant), but his recovery would not cover his heart attack. 
Or he could sue in tort, and recover for his emotional dis-
tress,15 but he would have to prove either that the defendant 
lacked title or the right of possession to the fence, (e. g. that 
12. Of course, the tenant may have to 
indemnify the landlord in such a case, 
but that will not help very much if the 
tenant is judgment-proof. 
13. 69 Cal.2d 108, 70 Cal. Rptr. 
97, 443 P.2d 561 (1968). See section 
IIA, supra. Also see Connor v. Great 
Western Savings and Loan Association, 
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69 Ca1.2d 887, 73 Cal. Rptr. 369, 447 
P.2d 609 (1968). 
14. 71 Ca1.2d -, 78 Cal. Rptr. 707, 
455 P.2d 811 (1969). 
15. See Richardson v. Pridmore, 97 
Cal. App.2d 124, 217 P .2d 113, 17 
A.L.R.2d 929 (1950). 
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plaintiff was not only in peaceable but also rightful possession) 
or that defendant's force was excessive (unreasonable). In 
other words, title plus reasonable force was a defense to a 
nonstatutory tort action. 
The problem in Daluiso, that of forcible entry, is frequently 
faced by the legal aid lawyer in representing a tenant who has 
been locked out because of nonpayment of rent. He has no 
trouble proving that the lockout is a forcible entry,16 but he 
can recover no real damages by suing in forcible entry and 
detainer. The tenant's main injury, the mental distress which 
comes from suddenly being without a place to live, is not 
recoverable in a statutory action.17 The closest the tenant can 
come to this kind of recovery is through a prayer for punitive 
damages. IS There is the possibility of getting something by 
way of treble damages under the Code of Civil Procedure sec-
tion 1174, but it is only the actual statutory damages that can 
be trebled, and they rarely exist. 19 For these reasons, the ten-
ant's attorney may choose to file a nonstatutory tort action in-
stead, but then he immediately runs into the problem that the 
tenant's default on the rent gave the landlord a right of pos-
session under the lease. Therefore, no tort was committed un-
less excessive force was used, and a lockout rarely entails ex-
cessive force. 
In Daluiso, the Supreme Court ended the harshness of the 
plaintiff's choice by eliminating the restrictions applicable to 
one of his options. It held that a plaintiff bringing a nonstatu-
tory tort action need not prove that his possession was right-
ful; that is, that title is no defense for the use of force, even 
when it is not excessive. Thus the plaintiff was allowed to 
recover for his heart attack. 
16. See Jordan v. Talbot; 55 Cal.2d 
597, 12 Cal. Rptr. 488, 361 P.2d 20, 6 
A.L.R.3d 161 (1961), and Lamey v. 
Mascriotra, 273 A.c.A. 767, 273 Cal. 
App.2d -, 78 Cal. Rptr. 344 (1969). 
17. See Anderson v. Taylor, 56 Cal. 
131, 38 Am. R. 52 (1880). 
18. See Wilkinson v. Singh, 93 Cal. 
App. 337, 269 P. 705 (1928). 
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19. While it is true that the tenant 
is entitled to rent for the time that he 
is out of possession, he also owes the 
landlord rent for the same period. The 
two will almost always offset each oth-
er. Karp v. Margolis, 159 Cal. App.2d 
69, 323 P.2d 557 (1958). 
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This result is less remarkable than the way in which it was 
reached. There were two ways by which a peaceable, albeit 
wrongful possessor, could be given pain and suffering dam-
ages. The Court here chose the hard way, by saying that they 
are recoverable in a nonstatutory action, thereby overturning 
the old rule that title was a defense. The easy way would have 
been to hold that pain and suffering are recoverable in a stat-
utory forcible entry and detainer action, because there is noth-
ing in the forcible entry statute limiting the plaintiff's damages 
in any fashion. 20 Anderson v. Taylor,l (quoted in Daluiso) 
held that a plaintiff may recover under the statute for all dam-
ages which are the natural and proximate result of a forcible 
entry. 2 Anderson then went on to hold, without any reasons 
at all, that bodily and mental pain were not the natural and 
proximate result of a forcible entry. The Supreme Court in 
Daluiso could then have said merely that the pain may not 
have been a natural and proximate result in Anderson, but 
that when it was proven to have resulted from the entry, it 
would be recoverable. Instead of having to overrule two 
earlier cases,3 it could merely have reinterpreted one earlier 
case.4 
Indeed, this might have been even more beneficial for plain-
tiffs, since the award could then have been trebled if the entry 
were wanton or malicious. 5 
Perhaps the reason for choosing the "harder" way to reach 
this result was the opportunity it gave to the Court to make 
a different argument. The Court's reason for rejecting title 
as a defense to a nonstatutory action was that the legislative 
policy against forcible entry should be judicially aided by 
20. Compare Code of Civ. Proc. §§ 
1159 et. seq., especially § 1174. 
1. 56 Cal. 131, 38 Am R. 52 (1880). 
2. "The damages occasioned to the 
plaintiff spoken of in the statute as au-
thorized to be assessed, are such only 
as are the natural and proximate result 
of the forcible entry or forcible or un-
lawful detainer, as the case may be." 
56 Cal. 131 at 132. 
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3. Canavan v. Gray, 64 Cal. 5, 27 
P. 788 (1883). Walker v. Chanslor, 153 
Cal. 118, 94 P. 606, 126 A.S. 61, 17 
Lns 455 (1908). 
4. Anderson v. Taylor, 56 Cal. 131, 
(1880), 38 Am. R. 52. 
5. See San Francisco & Suburban 
Home Building Society v. Leonard, 17 
Cal. App. 254, 119 P. 405 (1911). 
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treating such an entry as a wrong (i.e., a trespass) in all 
cases, whether statutory or nonstatutory. The earlier rule that 
the legislative remedy (a statutory action) was exclusive was 
overruled because its application frustrated the legislative pol-
icy against forcible entries. 
Thus two rules emerge from Daluiso. One rule is that title 
is not a defense in a nonstatutory action. But the other rule-
that the creation of a legislative remedy for forcible entry 
does not preclude broader judicial remedies-may be more 
important. For elsewhere in the landlord-tenant field, the ex-
istence of sections 1941 and 1942 of the Civil Code have long 
stood as the major obstacle to tenants' attempts to correct slum 
housing conditions. Section 1941 declares that a landlord 
must keep dwellings in a condition for occupancy. But sec-
tion 1942 declares that the tenant may leave, or spend up to 
one month's rent to make such repairs, if the landlord fails 
to do so. Our courts have traditionally held that the remedies 
under 1942 are the exclusive relief for violations of 1941.6 
The Daluiso logic now permits an inference that this may 
no longer be the case. If the legislative policy against self-
help evictions may be augmented by judicial tort actions, may 
it not also be held that the legislative policy against unsanitary 
housing may be judicially aided in a similar fashion? Just as 
the Supreme Court said in Daluiso that liberal interpretation 
of the remedy provision of the Code is not the only way to 
further a legislative policy against the legislative wrong, may 
not the same be said when the legislative wrong is slum 
housing? 
Of course, merely holding that a tenant has other remedies 
for violations of section 1941 than are prescribed in section 
1942, will do little for most tenants. Standard form leases 
are notorious for their provisions compelling tenants to waive 
their rights under these two sections, and if tenants may validly 
waive their rights under Civil Code 1941, it does not matter 
much that they could otherwise have had relief not mentioned 
6. See, e.g., Gately v. Campbell, 124 
Cal. 520, 57 P. 567 (1899). 
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in section 1942. Until our courts conclude that the right to 
sanitary housing, like the right to peaceful possession, cannot 
be waived,7 tenants' attacks on slum housing will be a losing 
battle. 
7. Jordan v. Talbot, 55 Ca1.2d 597, 
12 Cal. Rptr. 488, 361 P.2d 20 (1961). 
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